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US Arms Transfer Policy: The Feasibility of Restraint
Introduction
Frequently, in U.S. election campaigns or in international organizatons, poli_ticians
or diplomats speak of the need to limit world arms trade. Sometimes, as in the Carter
Administration, policies are formulated to define and enforce such limits. Nevertheless,
significant new military sales or aid agreements are often concluded through loopholes in
or inspite of such policies.

Major powers seem intent on responding to their opponents'

moves, and ship arms to countries confronted by the opponent or its friends.

Arms

transfer restraints are -often designed to be circumvented; the U.S. was able to respond to
Soviet moves in Afghanistan with sudden offers to Pakistan.
In the early days of his administration, Jimmy Carter specified, in a formal policy
directive (P .D. 13), that arms sales would be "an exceptional foreign policy implement, to
be used only in instances where it can be clearly demonstrated that the transfer
contributes to our national security interests." A dollar volume ceiling was placed on new
commitments and the burden of proving need ;as placed on the customer •

1

However, it

soon became clear that the Carter Administration was willing to approve a wide variety
of arms sales, that certain countries and commercial sales were exduded from ceilings,
and that new accounting methods were being employed in calculating yearly sales totals.
While F-16 and F-14 aircraft sales were vetoed, AWAC's radar planes and other equipment
were quickly approved for the Shah of Iran. As the Administration moved to increrase its
influence in regional conflicts ranging from the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan to Korea,
Southeast Asia, the Horn of Africa, Sahara, and Arabian Peninsula, it utilized arms
transfers as an integral, not exceptional, foreign policy tool.
Perhaps arms transfers are inevitably one of the foremost and .first pulled foreign
policy levers, and perhaps formal limitations on the use of such levers are doomed.
Flexibility is necessary in major power diplomacy, and without the offer or threat of arms
transfers such diplomacy cannot effectively respond to breaking events.

Goals often

-2listed for U.S. sales include:

(1) influence with foreign regimes; (2) national security

· through collective defense; (3) regional power balancing (war prevention); (4) substitution
for U.S. forces; (5) economic benefits. Major power governments generally seek control
over their country's arms export mainly to enhance diplomatic effect; they may veto
prospective customers if a sale would threaten diplomatic interests.·

Lesser power

governments are involved mainly to promote favorable trade· balances and sales for
domestic arms manufacturers. 2

Yet even major power governments are extremely

concerned with the success of domestic manufacturers, bo~h for trade balances and jobs,
and because their own military depends in a symbiotic relatio~ship on such producers.

3

Economic concerns increase the probability that while the major power government may
seek to control the destination of transfers, worries about volume will diminish as
political realities are confronted both at home and abroad.
Nevertheless, while a policy of restraint may be buffeted, the arguments for such a
policy remain cogent.

Regional disputes reach levels of astounding destruction--as in

Arab Israeli warfare-- in part because of the advanced weapons which are pumped in for
political reasons. Although a Senate subcommittee has concluded that many of the Carter
restraint policy's premises were wrong-- including the assumption that world arms sales
were spiralling

4

- certain effects of unrestrained weapons transfers to Iran during the

l 970's can now be assessed. Not only did they fail to protect the incumbent regime from
internal collapse, but they contributed to the revolutionary brew by draining much of the
country's revenues from needed internal development programs.
Sovereign states are, of course, free to arm themselves and even to squander their
resources in the process; presumably some retribution will.eventually result from foolish
decisions. Furthermore, we cannot say that arms transfers will inevitably lead to political
or social disruption~

Yet the question remains as to the interest of the donor state in

providing arms with little regard to regional political and social consequences in
particular cases.

While the Conventional Arms Transfer Talks· between the U.S. and

t

U.S.S.R., also an early Carter innovation, have broken down over Soviet interest in
discussing restraints on U.S. transfers to the Middle East and Asia (China), 5 just 15 years
ago U.S. officials lamented the USSR's refusal to "listen to reason" and discuss mutual
arms limitiations to the Middle East (this in light of their extensive transfers to Egypt in
the 1960's). Even though Americans now "enjoy" the influence of supplying arms to Egypt
and have displaced the USSR as the prime Middle Eastern arms supplier (60% since 1975),
what was reasonable in 1967 still somehow seems reasonable to those who reme·mber the
fiasco of a desert strewn with burnt out tanks and mutilated bodies.
-Therefore, we are left to ask about feasible and desirable goals for an arms sales
policy for the l 980's.

Is unilateral restraint any longer a viable approach?

Can such

restraint lead to multilateral agreements? How are policy guidelines likely to be treated . by a bureaucracy with strong agency interests and varying perspectives? What are the
likely intended or unintended consequences of various alternative policies, and particularly those which might resemble P.D. 13? These are the main questions addressed in this
study, although consideration of multilateral ·restraints can only be treated tangentially at this point.
To answer some of these questions it is necessary to review the history of U.S.
transfer policy6 and elaborate upon its consequences both in Washington and abroad •. In
this context we mu~t also note that guidelines are not solely produced by the Executive
branch, and that Congress has passed extensive and sometimes contradictory legislation
on arms sales.

Of ten, though, Congress allows suspension of rules if the President

determines and defends the necessity, and Congress is also quite subject to political
pressures for easing restrictions almost as soon as they are passed.
Therefore, we will evaluate the broad range of U.S. transfer policy, concentrating
on sales as opposed to aid (as the Government has done increasingly in recent years}. The
the role of the b1,1reaucracy in implementing the guidelines will also be delineated on the
basis of interviews in Washington.

Prospects for future restraints depend in· ·part on
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agencies' and bureaus' interests. Interviews reveal some surprising emerging coaHtions on
these issues, and surprising consensus as well. Furthe_rmore, we seek more understanding
of the way agencies and decision-makers balance contradictory concerns in different
international circumstances - for example, concerns for regional power balances vs.
concerns about individual foreign governments' survival, concerns about inappropriate
export of sophisticated technology vs. desire to maximize exports so that production costs
are reduced and production runs lengthened.
Recent History of U.S. Arms Sales Policy
Until the mid-1970's there was no _formal general U.S. policy on the sale of arms,
partly because policy-makers wished to maintain flexibility on the issue.
security issues dominated over economic interests.7

Political and

Occasionally restrictions were

enunciated and enforced, as in the Tripartite Agreement (British-French-U.S.) against
sales to the Arabs and Israelis in the early 1950's. Most U.S. transfers in the 50's were aid·
packages, and consisted of outdated or surplus equipment.

Washington concentrated on

_supplying developing states bordering the U.S.S.R. and China mainly through SEA TO and
CENTO. Non-aligned countries were also supplied, after Soviet competition intensified in
1955, if such countries supported American military objectives.

8

With increased Soviet, British, and French sales competition during the 1960's, U.S.
approaches and policies evolved futher.

McNamara's Pentagon began to see benefits in

replacing aid programs with vigorous sales promotions.

Gold flow and trade balance

problems could be remedied; costs of more sophisticated technology could be reduced and
supplies assured by longer production runs; - co-production agreements might satisfy
nationaiistic buyers and better integrate them into the U.S. defense network. 9 The State
Department maintained primary responsibility for deciding on transfers, but few consistent clear foreign policy objectives guided the decisions. At the same time, Henry Kuss
was given a mandate for sales promotion through the Pentagon. Four sales "teams" were
charged with promotions to specific groups of countries. McNamara noted that buisiness

,.,

-5had· only a limited interest in overseas sales promotions; only five percent of military
equipment produced .in the U.S. was exported at that time. 10
The volume of U.S. transfers did not greatly increase until the Vietnam war, even
though sales were increasingly substituted for aid. Arms shipments to Vietnam increased
considerably after 1966 but the rest of the the world was held at relatively constant
levels. Vietnam also occasioned the first substantial increase in the yearly delivery of
major weapons, defined as aircraft, missiles, armored vehicles, and warships-(see Figure
2).

Even so, during this period the U.S.S.R., on the basis of massive Middle Eastern

shipments, came to supercede the U.S. as a supplier of Third World weapons.
While Congress passed foreign aid programs in the 60's, and while military aid was
generally more popular than developmental aid on "the Hill," such programs were viewed
as relatively costly iri comparison to military sales, especially in light of growing balance
of payments problems. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency were implemented in part to assist the Executive branch in judging
the implications of arms transfers. The Foreign Military Sales Act of 1959 and the Mutual
'

Security Act of 1968 both set. criteria for controlling arms exports, while permitting
foreign sales and establishing mechanisms for keeping sales consistent with U.S. foreign
po~icy. Sales were viewed as too important to U.S. strategic interests to leave merely to
private companies; essentially the Federal Government would contract to purchase the
weapons and transfer them overseas upon receipt o~ pclyment from or grant of credit to
11
. .
t he rec1p1ent country.
Still, relatively little advanced and sophisticated weaponry had been transferred to
the Third World until the Nixon Administration.

With the Nixon Doctrine and Henry

Kissinger's determination to establish regional police powers, such as Iran, to help the U.S.
"stabilize" regions in the wake of Vietnam, many sophisticated weapons (F-14, F-15, F-4,
F-5 aircraft, tanks, air-to-surface missiles, etc.) were sold or transferred on credit to

Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Korea, Israel, and a number of Third World states.

Latin

-6.,.

America was included, although the emphasis had previously been on transferring
relatively obsolete weapons there in order to dampen arms races and warfare.
Dollar volume of U.S. transfers spurted twice during the 70's (Figure 2), first in
conjunction with emerging U.S.-Iranian relations as well as "Vietnamization" of that war,
and the second in response to vastly increased Middle Eastern oil wealth.

Part of the

relative restraint of the 60's had been due to strategic doctrines which emphasized
"flexible response" and a direct role for US conventioi;ial forces in defending client states.
The U.S. supplied more counter-insurgency weapons than sophisticated strategic weapons.12 The Vietnam experience indicated to Kissinger that it would be politically and
economically cheaper to equip client states to carry the burden of regional defense, hence
the shipment of weapons more suited to major conventional warfare.

In a sense,

American arms were substituted for American troops.
Burgeoning sales in the 70's stemmed from a number of factors in addition to the
Nixon Doctrine. Soviet arms supplies and advisers had begun reaching Latin America in
the 70's and had penetrated the Mid~le East throughout the 60's and during the buildup to
the 1973 war. The U.S. tri~d to maintain its influence with increasingly ambitious Latin
American military leaders in order to oppose radical revolution.

The Vietnam war

occasioned the ·introduction of much sophisticat~d weaponry on both sides, and security
interests also seemed to demand the release of high technology weapons to certain Asian
allies. Futher, arms sales to the Middle East could help recoup coveted "petro-dollars."
. Thus, in the 15 years from 1963-78 US arms transfers shot from approximately $1.5..;.
billion to over $7-billion; economic ir.tterests found a place-- albeit probably still
secondarily - in U.S. transfer decisions.

Sophisticated weapons were far more widely

distributed; competition from other arms producers reduced the US share of the world
arms trade from 50 percent (1968) to 39 percent. US sales to Europe, Japan, Canada, and

.

Australia went from 80 percent of the total (1964) to 14 percent, with the remainder
going to the Third World. 13

Government-to-government sales_ came to represent 90

percent of U.S. arms.transfers, despite an increasingly brisk commercial sales business.

-7The Carter Response and Beyond
Responding to the massive buildup of U.S. arms sales, especially to the Middle East,
President Carter was quick to enunciate a comprehensive conventional arms transfer
. policy.

In calling for unilateral U.S. restraint, Carter hoped to inspire reciprocal

restraints by other major arms suppliers.

Hopes were dashed with the breakdown of

Conventional Arms Transfer Talks in 1979, while the pressure of events and vested
interests steadily weakened U.S. restraints. Nevertheless, the policy outlined in P .D. 13
and the 1976 Congressional legislation which preceded it have lingering effects and
constitute a model against which future sales decisions and future policy guidelines will be
weighed.
The immediate impetus for arms transfer restraint in the late-70's came from
Congressional legislation.

The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Act of 1968 arid the

International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 responded to the
vastly expanded FMS and commercial sales programs and the large commitments to Asian
and Middle Eastern states after the mid-60's. These acts have now been further amended
with the Iranian revolution and Afghan invasion; while restrictions on transfer were
increased in 1976, they have been weakened with subsequent events.
The Arms Export Control Act called for a US -policy to reduce the international
arms trade and called for attempts at both unilateral and multilateral restraint •. Sales
were not to exceed 1976 levels, and the President was to study and propose policies and
legislation to achieve these goals.

Congress was to be notified )0 days in advance of

major proposed sales and transfer agreements. In the case of FMS transactions of $25million or more, or sales of major defense systems valued at $7-million or more, Congress
would have a veto power by vote of both houses, unless the President stated that an
emergency existed requiring the sale for U.S. national security. Details of the proposed
major sales had to include arms control impact statements, reasons for the sale, likely
impacts on U.S. weapons stocks, analyses of the impact on the recipient country and

b
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region, estimates of alternate sources for such defense articles, estimates of U.S. costs
and personnel commitments, etc. Commercial sales .of "major defense equipment" valued
at more than $25-million (since changed, after considerable corporate lobbying, to $35million, and then to $100-million and to exempt NATO) were prohibited and had to come
under FMS procedures (allowing Congressional review). Manufacturers have argued that
such requirements greatly slow sales approvals, and that lethal weapons are not
necessarily the most expensive weapons; they have also pushed to have many items
removed from the commercial munitions lists (requiring State Department licenses) .and
transferred to Commerce Department lists and licenses (easier to obtain).

The trend

toward Congressional review and preference for FMS procedures reversed Congressional
preferences in the early l 970's for commercial sales.
Congress has yet to veto a proposed major sale of either the FMS or comi:nercial
varieties, although key senators pressured in 1980 to have President Carter withdraw a
plan to provide sophisticated bomb racks and extra fuel pods for the F-15's sold, despite
some Congressional protest, to Saudi Arabia in 1978. Hawk missiles sold to Jordan were
also confined to stationary rather than mobile mounts after Congressional objections.

14

Thus, both the ceiling on yearly FMS authorizations and the ceiling on commercial
transactions have come under fire from manufacturing, Congressional, and bureaucratic
interests.

Industries have convinced many on Capitol Hill that inflation has made

commercial ceilings unworkable.

The House International Relations Committee has

moved to emphasize sales facilitation, as support for restraint fades. Leasing possibilities
have been explored for certain weapons or facilities.
Responding in part to Congressional initiatives, the Carter Administration set two
rather contradictory and vague objectives for its new restraint policy in 1977:

(1) to

facilitate transfers that "clearly promote" U.S. or allied security; and (2) to restrain those
transfers in excess of legitimate defense needs, or which "promote regional arms races or
increase instability or otherwise do not advance U.S. interest. 1115 The specific guidelines
•

-9were less vague, but they were also hedged by provisions for presidential exceptions: (1)
the U.S. would not be the first to introduce into a region "newly developed, advanced
weapons systems which could create a new or significantly higher combat capability;" (2)
the U.S. would not sell newly developed, advanced systems until they are "operationally
deployed with U.S. forces;" (3) the U.S.

would not permit "development or significant

modification of weapons systems solely for export;" (4) the U.S. would no~ permit coproduction agreements with other countries for significant weapons, equipment, and major
components; (5) the U.S. would "not allow American weapons or equipment to be
transferred to third parties without U.S. Government consent;" and (6) actions by "agents
of the United States or private manufacturers which might promote the sale of arms
abroad" would require "policy-level authorization by the Department of State."

In

addition a quantitative dollar ceiling was imposed each year on the total of new
commitments under the foreign military sales (FMS) and assistance programs.

The FY

1978 ceiling of $8.5 billion was an 8 percent reduction from 1977, with a further 8 percent_

reduction in 1979 (the 1980 ceiling was not reduced). The burden of proving need for sales
was put on the buyers or proponents of the the transaction. 16
However, in order to allow the President sufficient discretion, and to lessen the
impact of the ceiling, provisions were made for presidential exceptions to _each provision.
Services such as construction (a major portion of U.S. military sales to a country like
Saudi Arabia) and commercial transfers were not included.

Transfers to important allies

or clients- NA TO countries, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Israel--were similp.rly
excluded.
In addition, accounting procedures were changed in ways the General Accounting
Off ice (GAO) has found questionable.
Under the new procedure in effect since fiscal year 1977, foreign
military sales budget authority for a given year has been defined as
equal to the portion of old and new acceptances which will result in
implementing obligations during the year. In other words, foreign
military sales budget auth~9ty since 1977 has not shown the full
·
amount of new acceptances.

-10In prior years FMS budget authority had been based "on the dollar total" of new
acceptances during the year, and the budget recorded billions of dollars of unobligated
sales authority, i.e., acceptances which had not yet resulted in U.S. Government orders
for th~ items specified. This gave a more accurate picture of the overall volume of FMS
funds. The GAO estimated that the amount deleted from reported 1977 budget authority
was $12-13 billion, $9 billion of which was in the FMS trust fund. The figure shown in the
1977 budget understated the "true authority" for obtaining items specified in new
acceptances by $2.6 billion. Pentagon spokesmen tried to defend this procedure by noting
that it gave a clearer picture of transfers actually consumated in a given year. General
Graves, Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) has pointed to the
reduced ceiling on the dollar volume of new commitments in a given fiscal year, and has
linked the "entirely new separate accounting system" at DSAA to the need to assure the
ceiling's required reduction. 18 In short, while the ceiling itself has been lowered, the
Carter Administration was able to circumvent it so· that American arms transfers
(including those to allies) totaled $15.2-billion in 1978, $13.5-billion via FMS, a 16%
increase from 1977, the only year of substantially reduced exports. 19
Below, the stances of both critics and defenders of ceilings and other specific
restraints will reviewed. Critics have noted that with so many loopholes, the limits are
f ictitious-...a convenient way for a president to appear to be an arms controller while
continuing business as usual. However, the extent of debate over the rules indicates that
restraints have tangible effects, whether intended or unintended, on transfers and the way
responsible agencies regulate them, If no effects and no stakes were involved, P .D. 13
and Congressional oversight would hardly be on anyone's mind in industries or the relevant
governmental agencies.

It remains to evaluate the impacts and stakes in order to

understand the likely fate of these policies in the 1980's. Perhaps the bureaucrats merely
wrestle with and resent extra meaningless paper work. However many maintain that P .D.
13 and the Export Control Act's effects go beyond mere paperwork, and produce benefits.

-11Policy Inplementation
The major actors and agencies involved in implementation of the Carter sales
process are outlined in Figure 4. One of the bureaucratic effects of the policy was to
center responsibility for the evaluation process in the State Department's Office of
Security Assistance and Sales (in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs). The Defense
Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) nevertheless has had considerable impact since
technical evaluations of weapons systems and country capabilities must come from the
Defense Department (DOD). Consideration of commercial arms sales and export license
applications have been focussed in the Office of Munitions Control at State.
While responsibility was centered, prospective FMS and controversial commercial
cases were widely distributed to a number of concerned agencies, including the Arms
· Control and Disarmanent Agency (ACDA), whose role expanded greatly in the early
Carter days with Paul Warnke as director. Warnke was the first ACDA director to have
significant input on the National Security Council's Policy Review Committee which
ultimately set arms transfer ceilings. 20

The National Security Council (NSC) role

expanded as well, with many more transfer cases going from the State Department to the
President for approval. The National Security Advisor commented on· these cases and
included summaries of conflicting agency views in dossiers passed to the President. The
Arms Export. Control Board (AECB) was created in the 1960's to facilitate policy
deliberation, with representatives of the ten agencies involved in the transfer process
included:

State, DOD, Treasury, Commerce, CIA, NSC, Office of Management and

Budget (0MB), Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), ACDA, and Agency for International
Development (AID). The AECB consists of various sub-groups to handle specific types of
negotiations, and rarely meets as a unit, although it reports to Congress.

Most inter-

agency consultation has been on an ad hoc basis, with the Security Assistance Office at
State routil')g proposed sales to appropriate agencies for approval or comment.

-12There is considerable redundancy in this system; various offices in State, DOD, CIA,
and ACDA have regional desks to handle questions of sales to specific countries.

Desk

officers are in frequent . touch with each other; officials defend the redundancy by
claiming that it allows the various agencies to communicate more effectively since the
desk officers all specialize in the same countries and receive much the same information.
State Department officers supposedly

stress political repercussions, DOD stresses

military consequences; ACDA stresses arms control impacts; AID (a minor actor) advises
on opportunity costs to countries' develop111ent programs; Labor, Commerce, and Treasury
stress balances of payments and finance questions for FMS; CIA offers "threat" analyses
of prospective purchasers' enemies; and NSC monitors transfers.

In practice these

distinctions are frequently blurred, and the suspicion persists that no agency wants to
trust determinations of country conditions or needs to the other agencies.

Hence, each

agency seeks its own regional analyses. Reasons for this correspond to agencies' stakes in
the sales process, as well as "normal" bureaucratic pressure for agency growth.
Although the roles and perspectives of various offices obviously overlap, certain
emphases exist.

The State Department's general policy coordination responsiblity has

. already been discussed; requests for arms transfers often come through U.S. embassies
around the world. The Office of Security Assistance and Sales also receives weekly lists
of requests from the Defense Department. Regional, legal affairs, and policy planning
bureaus are frequently involved to advise on country or regional ramifications and legal
questions. The Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs has been included when
the recipient has a questionable rights record; however, Human Rights merely advises the
Secretary about the record, and makes no policy determination on its own.
The. Defense Department determines the requirements and military capabilities of
the prospective recipients, oversees the procurement and delivery of equipment, and
establishes priorities for shipments. 21 Defense offices also carrry on liaison with manufacurers to facilitate production and procurement (through regional DOD offices, and
•.

-13sometimes even offices inside the plants).

The · Assistant Secretary of Defense for

International Security Affairs (I.S.A.) has general authority and responsibility within the
Department for _arms transfers, and reports to the Secretary. · Military Assistance
Advisory Groups (MAAG), substantially reduced in size during the Carter Administration,
are located in U.S. embassies and evaluate country requests while consulting with the host
country's defense officials.

MAAG's have been prohibited from promoting sales under

Carter's P.D. 13 edicts, but the line between consultation and evaluation on the one hand
and promotion on the other can be quite fine.

Countries, especially those being

considered for important sales, are also visited by inter-agency evaluation teams, led by
DOD officials. Such teams report on the needs and "ab~orptive capacity "of prospective
purchasers i.e., ability to use weapons effectively.
The Joint · Chiefs of Staff have a two-fold function in arms transfers.

They

recommend military and force objectives and identify the priorities for and weapons
systems which can be sent to certain countries and regions. Such recommendations are
made in conjunction with U.S. war plans, so that presumably systems are not released
which would complicate

l!-5.

military missions in those regions (e.g., the sale of air

defense systems which could be used against U.S. aircraft).

The individual military

departments are responsible for preparing the data for the development of assistance
programs and budget estimates.
While the bureaucratic politics literature indicates that agency priorities and
interests will differ greatly, causing substantial potential conflict and complicated
bargaining on particular policies, there seems to be a, developing inter-agency consensus
on arms transfer policy. This is perhaps easiest to see when we consider both the criteria
by which various agency officials say they evaluate prospective sales and officials'
reactions to P .D. 13. 22

...

Bureaucrats administering the arms policy evidently play the role of managers
concerned with effidency of transactions, "prioritizing"

•

sales, regional political and

-14military balances, justification and reports to Congress, and controls on the release of
sensitive U.S. technology. In administering a sales restraint policy, which stemmed from
supposed Congressional and Executive concern about proliferating conventional arms
stockpiles and capabilities around the world, the relevant officials evidence remarkably
little concern about overall proliferation or arms control and disarmament per se. Such
concern diminished even further after the SALT II failure and Afghanistan invasion.
Instead, even those in the Arms Control Agency evaluate sales according to regional
balances, purchasers' need or absorptive capacity for certain technologies, the quantitative limits beyond which new sales would begin to threaten neighbors and U.S.

national

security interests.
In fact, PD 13, with its six qualitative restraints (see above) and required FMS
reports to Congress provided such a neat focus for administrators that it was easy to
ignore other long range considerations and concentrate on determining whether a certain
sale introduced new technology to a region, whether_ U.S. supplies of the weapon would be
jeopardized, whether the syst~m was solely designed for export, whether a co-production
or third country transfer was justified, etc.

Administrators, even those in defense

agencies, grew to like the policy or parts of it, since it gave them clear criteria and check
lists, provided excuses if they wished to turn down a sale without embarrassment,
encouraged much earlier and more thorough inter-agency review of proposed sales and
setting of priorities (because of the FMS ceiling), and emphasized the need to assure
. adequate supplies for U.S. forces before sales were made. While the fall of the Iranian
Shah gav_e decision-makers pause about the appropriateness and effectiveness of significant sales to the Third World, there_ are still few clear criteria by which to judge the
staying power and political support of a recipient government. It is easier to concentrate
on P .D. 13 provisions, or regional military balances.
While ACDA spokesmen have noted in Congressional testimony that the qualitative
controls "dampen the proliferation of arms production capabilities in third world coun-
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tries," they claim it is not possible to put a dollar value on sales turned down or turned off
(quick discouragement) or to compare them to years before PD 13. 23 Several hundred
cases have been turned down, but few agency officials interviewed stressed the reduction
of sales volume as one of the key benefits of P.D. 13 or Congressional review.
Ambiguity of goals and stress on careful management as opposed to major sales
reduction is evident in the following justification from ACDA:
In short on the one hand, the guidelines have yielded direct benefits to
U.S. national security by insuring that all transfers are carefully
considered so as to reduce the risks. At the same time, these
guidelines have enabled us to continue meeting our foreign policy and
defense re~irements with relatively few Presidential exceptions to
the policy.
.
That few presidential exceptions have been necessary could mean that the limits set by
the policy have not greatly constrained anyone interested in sales, but have afforded
opportunities to negate specific sales. ACDA was allowed greater input on decisions when
it became apparent that their Congressionally mandated concerns in arms control impact
statements--i.e., with regional arms races, escalation of conflict, or arms control
agreements--could mesh rather well with DOD concerns about release of sensitive
technology and preservation of U.S. control in light of shaky regimes abroad. 25 Hence,
compared to the State Department where regional bureaus generally favored sales, DOD
had few objections to including. ACDA in the inter-agency bargaining and coalition
building process~ ACDA's concern for regional balances is seen in other agencies as its
main contribution to the decision process.
As one indicator of consensus on the general principles· of arms sales policy, note
that ACDA was consulted and rendered an opinion on 1360 proposed sales in FY 1979, and
objected to 199 (15 percent). 26 Most of these objections were ultimately sustained~ Once
a decision to sell was made (and with P.D. 13's emphasis on qualitative restrictions, many
less sophisticated articles can be sold), ACDA tried to press for defensive as opposed to
offensive emphases and force configurations. Hence ACDA increasingly focussed on fal_lback positions, on dampening regional arms races, and on containing potential for
international terrorism.

-16In 1979-80, six-months of inter-agency review went into consensus building on the
controversial development of an F-X intermediate jet fighter solely for export, an explicit
contradiction of a P.D. 13 provision. Remarkably, spokesmen came to justify the decision
to proceed as an arms control maneuver. Since there was no suitable aircraft for export
to replace aging F-5's around the world except the sophisticated F-15, F-16 and F-18,
production of an upgraded F-5, the F-X (technically Northrop's F-5G was the leading F-X
candidate) would provide an alternative to the "necessity" of exporting America's most
advanced systems. When arms control is taken to mean the development of alternative
jet fighters, and when decision-makers admit they would have "no choice" but to sell high
technology aircraft upon request, the momentum for arms sales in all parts of the Federal
bureaucracy, as well as the symbolic uses of one P .D. 13 provision to negate another
become evident.
While there is general and growing arms transfer consensus, certain bureaucratic
rivalries and frictions still exist.

Under President Carter, an extraordinary number of

major FMS cases above $?-million went to the White House itself for review and ultimate
decision (an estimated 88 out of 126 cases). Thus, the views of the National Security
Adviser were added to the already myriad comments of lower level agencies and Cabinet
departments on proposed sales. Indeed the Conventional Arms Transfer Talks themselves
seemed to fail largely because of the conflicting priorities of those at State Department,
Politico-Military Affairs in Carter's early days, and the National Security Adviser.

27

There is a lingering opinion at both State and Pentagon agencies that more decisions
should be taken at the Assistant Secretary and Secretarial levels. Some military agency
field and action officers feel that they could handle decisions on matters such as the
ultimate defensive or offensive configuration of aircraft in areas such as the Middle East
more quietly in consultation with purchasing country-military officers._ Some remember
having done so before P.O. 13 required more high level approvals and clearances. Others
with high level experience at ACDA lay the blame for the eroding emphasis on arms

.

control under P.D. 13 to the influence of the National Security Adviser.
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Certain offices can estimate sales' effects using relatively concrete indicators, as
when the Joint Chiefs estimate a country's needs and capabilities focussing on orders of
battle, size of military, or threatening neighbors. Other agencies, such as International
Security Affairs (ISA) at the Defense Department, deal more with intangibles in
estimating government longevity or political repercussions, and rely on CIA and DIA
estimates as well as "open source" material. Rates of sales approval ~an vary between
those potential purchasers reasonably able to purchase comparable weapons elsewhere as
opposed to those relying heavily on U.S. supplies-- a determination quickly made noting
the supplies. in their inventories.

Bureaucratic disagreement can arise in Washington

about· degrees of dependency, and about the advisability of risking businesslike relations
by turning down a request by a dependent country (P .D. 13 helps here by affording an
excuse).

Functional bureaus concerned with P.D. 13 questions often line up across

departments in opposition to the regional bureaus which somewhat more frequently favor
sales. In fact certain DOD agencies were more critical of F-X development than certain
State Department agencies. DOD estimated that the technological gap between the F-5
and the F-16 and 18 was narrower than State maintained, and would be closed even
further by the time an F-X was marketed and obsolescence set in on the 16 and 18.
However, such DOD views are tempered by Joint Chiefs' priorities for support of
cooperative military establishments around the· world; the Joint Chiefs' staff tends to
assume that target countries can be controlled through the military, and that the military
are the logical leaders for many Third World states.
Defense Department capability estimates can be complicated.

Analysts might

conclude that three F-5's could do the job of one F-15 in a Third World state, and reduce
costs while restricting release of technologies. Yet they might still recommend the F-15
because the greater number of planes would overtax the recipient's piloting or servicing
capability.

Hence, U.S. defense bureaucrats are put in the position of thinking for

recipients in determining whether force proposals are "appropriate" to the situation .

•
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However, reverse pressure is applied through Congress in some cases (notably Israel-which is treated as a quasi-ally under P.D.-13 --and Taiwan) if the recipient or other
concerned states object either to a sale or a denial.
.

.

Ongoing client relations will have much to do with Pentagon sales authorizations.
Saudi Arabia evidently pushed and paid for the rather rash dispatch of arms to North
Yemen (in the midst of continued Soviet supplies to that country) in 1979. Weapons flow
to Jordan partly as a response to that country's integral role in training and facilitating
U.S. cooperation with Gulf states on the Arabian coast (this probably has something to do
with the relative U.S. silence about_ Jordanian support for Iraq in its war with Iran in
1980).

On the commercial sale side, Bureaus of Munitions Control at both State and DOD
maintain nearly constant touch with manufacturers potentially applying for licenses.
Thirty-thousand license applica~ions per year are received by the State Department;
though the number was down 13 percent in 1979 the dollar value of commercial sales
continued to grow as FMS reporting procedures made commercial sales more desirable
(see Figure 3 and the evident effect of Congressional action in 1976).

Companies were

given advice on licensing possibilities before negotiating their sales, or could defer certain
sales which would not qualify under P .D. 13.
Carter's policy even by industry groups.

These have been considered benefits of

However P .D. 13 did not apply to the bulk of

commercial business, which went to U.S. allies. Eighty percent of license applications
were considered routine and could be approved or vetoed by license officers ref erring to
the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. Twenty percent were "controversial" and
were routed to relevant agencies for review. At the State Department such cases would
be sent to the Security Assistance and Sales Office as well as regional bureaus; unless
they concerned very sensitive issues they would generally not be seen at the Assistant
Secretary level or above.

-19The Defense Department's Munitions Control Office also has been closely linked to
manufacturing interests with an evident perception that firms should be assisted in sales
to further U.S. competition with other arms exporting countries and because of the need
for ever more advanced technology. Lists of prospective customers for the F-X have been
/

prepared and approved through P .D. 13 criteria, although officially sales of the new
aircraft are to be reviewed under P.D. 13 (the five oper~ble criteria) on a "case_ by case"
basis.
On the whole then, P.D. 13 and accompanying legislation have been seen throughout
the bureaucracy as a useful management tool, though not necessarily very relevant to
arms control.

These provisions allow for more systematic sales priorities, quicker

turndowns and turnoffs with less embarrassment when administrators do not want to
dispatch arms, quicker and better notice of companies' foreign sg.les promotions, easier
protection for U.S. inventories and procurement needs, clearer evaluative· criteria and
checklists, and overall, more order iri a complicated and sometimes chaotic policy arena.
While such benefits may make life easier for bureaucrats, the overall policy impacts must
also be analyzed.
Policy Evaluation and the Future
Clearly most of the provisions of post-1976 arms restraint policy had been dented if
not breached by the time of the Reagan election.

The policy may have improved

bureaucratic management, albeit while promoting bureaucratic redundancy, and for this
reason elements of it may be retained in the 1980's, but it did not fundamentally alter
bureaucratic priorities. The question remains as to what worldwide and domestic effects
the policy has had as well as what prospects remain for its continuation in the next
administration.
Despite formal restraints, sophisticated new technologies have been introduced to
the Middle East and other regions; AW AC's radar systems were earmarked for Iran and
Saudi Arabia (though U.S. pers9nnel kept some measure of control).

The Middle East

-20came to be seen as a de facto exception to P.D. 13.

F-X export development was

authorized. More exceptions were granteq on co-production (13) than any other P .D. 13
provision, although it seems that most requests for third country transfers were refused.
Priorities for operational deployment of· systems with U.S. forces seem to have been
successfully enforced, but assuring that U.S. personnel do not promote sales abroad,
especially in light of military consultation, the use of agents and intermedjaries, and close
government - company relations, has been extremely difficult. Officials cite discouragement of company promotions as supposed evidence of the fulfillment of this provision;
however, it was 'further eroded when the ban on U.S. participation in international arms
trade fairs was lifted.

Nevertheless, proposed transfers have been refused, and it is

necessary to evaluate the consequences and benefits.
To arms control advocates, the delays built into P.D. 13 and FMS procedures are
beneficial in slowing the rates of approval; estimates on time for FMS sales range from
six months to several years depending on technological and political issues; comparable
rates for export-minded Great Britain, for example, are from one the three weeks.
Critics note that delays jeopardize Defense Department relations with manufacturers. If
prices and delivery dates cannot be quoted, production lines which depend on subcontracts
cannot be programmed.

Contractors might abandon

a product if assurances of foreign

sales cannot be obtained, and the Defense Department might lose a valued commodity.
Foreign buyers are generally asked to move to the end of the production line, as U.S.
needs have priority; therefore, delays can discourage agreements.

However, there are

ways around almost all these provisions especially if the customer is willing to pay
premiums to expedite delivery. The "no export only" and "no promotions" provisions were
the only facets of PD 13 totally new to U.S. arms sales management, and even these
provisions would not be crucially limiting because most countries want equipment which
has been purchased and tested by the American military.

-21Carter Administration White House spokesmen who noted the effectiveness of P .D.
13 mentioned that aggregate sales to the Third World declined in 1979. However, NATO
sales, which now can be cleared by the State Department without NSC review, increased,
and sales to Israel and certain Arab states continued to mount; these states are often not
included in tallies of "Third World" states.
It was maintained that A-7 and F-18 aircraft crtainly would have been sold to Iran
and F-16's to South Korea if it had not been for P .D. 13. Advanced aircraft in Korea
could have spurred a peninsular arms race. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that Mr.
Warnke at ACDA argued and won the restriction on F-16's early in the Carter years over
the objections of Mr. Brzezinski. Mr. Warnke later left the Government, as arms control
attitudes and the influence of Mr. Brzezinski changed markedly.

Personal influence

rather than the policy itself accounted for these successes.
To better evaluate the effects of sales restraint we can look to the years of greatest
decrease in transfers, 1977-78. Table !shows the items sold to and those denied every
country in the world those years; these data evidently were inadvertently made available
in testimony to the Senate Budget Committee and unfortunately cannot be compared to
similar figures for years before P.O. 13. Nevertheless we can derive some idea of the
types of restraint and the regions where restraint was mosl evident.
While bureaucrats speak of various restrairit criteria--regional balances, release of
technology, U.S. force readiness, etc. it appears that the release of sophisticated
techonology was the main reason for denying Third World sales, especially in Africa.
Despite increasing cost, countries increasingly seek sophisticated air-to-ground and naval
missilry and laser guided weapons (naturally some countries would also seek credits).
These have been denied so far to African countries, and in some cases to Latin America
and Asia. P.D. 13 seems far less relevant to Middle Eastern dealings where questions of

.,

regional balance may predominate in Washington considerations, i.e. extremely advanced
weapons were dispatched but evidently only in quantities designed to limit Arab offensive
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capabilities and threats to neighbors.

Limitations of co-production, third country

transfers, and sales promotions show up in Asian transfers, as companies seem ready to
increase exports to this region. In South and Central America, significant spare parts and
radars were sold--and even attack aircraft in Chile's case - but concern for regional arms
race balance, between Brazil and Argentina and in Central America, was evident as well.
With a history of recent warfare, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragria and El Salvador were
denied certain advanced t~nk and gunnery capabilities. It must be noted, though, that the
pressure is mounting for increased sales, especially commercial sales, to Chile and
Argentina which were somewhat restricted because of human rights problems.
Although certain turndowns, such as Israeli "Kfir" sales to Ecuador and Swedish
Viggen sales to India, drew considerable attention, relatively few requests for third
country transfers have been denied; the State Department noted that most countries want
to transfer older and excess equipment which raise few policy issues.

28

The 13

Presidential exceptions to the co-production ban over the three years from 1977-79
included a mixture of high and low technology weapons such as rifles, grenade launchers,
howitzers, ammunition, and less advanced air defense missiles and aircraft.

Co-

production cases denied included 155mm rounds, Maverick and Stinger missile motors,
Dragon missile systems, and 2.75 inch rockets. No compliance violations of bans on reexporting co-produced equipment were reported.

Some NATO members may have

hesitated to conclude co-production agreements because restrictions on third country
transfers seemed to threaten export markets. 29
available to U.S.

As for sales of equipment not yet

forces, t~e government listed denials of Copperhead, Viper, and

Blackhawk helicopter systems.
Furthermore, surprisingly the State Department has "been able to identify only a
few, significant cases in whi7h other suppliers of weapons made sales. • .equivalent to
those which were denied by the U.S." There were only three major examples: French
fighter sales to Ecuador; French fighter sales to Pakistan after the U.S. A-7 refusal; u.,K.

-23Jaguar aircraft sale to India after U.S. refusal to sell deep strike aircraft or authorize
Swedish Viggen sales. Such British or French sales may have gone through without U.S.
denials since cu~tomers often consider alternate products simultaneously. 30
Other supposed successes of_ the restraint policy included a shifting emphasis toward
NATO rather than Third World sales, although the U.S. was the leader in Third World sales
in the decade of the 70's. The NATO share of U.S. worldwide FMS and commercial sales
climbed from 5.6 percent in 1976 to 19.1 percent in 1979. 31

It could be argued though

that the restraint policy did not produce this change, but rather reflected the new
emphasis on NA TO in its very guidelines (NATO exemptions and facilitation of commercial sales to NATO). Furthermore, as indicated in Figure 3, the restraint policy and FMS
procedures seemed to spur commercial sales to take up some of the slack after 1975.
When commercial sales are added to FMS, sales decline during the Carter years is much
less pronounced and really confined to the year 1977 (1979 figures were not available and
may have shown a similar dip due to cancelled Iranian contracts and world economic
factors).
Congressional and Carter Administration restraints have also failed to stem the tide
of major weapons exports (Figure 1). With temporary fluctuations, these exports have
shot upwards since 1975 despite U.S. concerns about exported technology. The Americans, Soviets, Fr.ench, and to a lesser extent the British and Italians seem to be intent on
vastly increasing the sale of major systems both for economic gain and as a part of
strategic competition. While ar_ms restraint critics commonly assume that unilat~ral sales
reductions result mainly in advantages for competitors, the data indicate relatively few
substitution effects. Instead the U.S. and U.S.S.R. follow quite parallel sales courses, as
do most of the Europeans. Occasionally, as in U.S. -Soviet figures for 1968-70 and 1976,
one country's sales declines might accompany another's increase.
Britain and France in 1973-75 as well.

This was true for

But as seen in Figure 2, when world arms sales

increase or decrease, most suppliers benefit or suffer· simultaneously.

Moreover, the

-24occasions for sales spurts or declines frequently have more to do with regional or political
issues than with inter-supplier sales competition. The Soviets' sales peaks of the late 60's
related to replacement of Egyptian war losses and Vietnam commitments and Middle
Eastern opportunities.

The correspondence of peaks in 1973 (Figure 2) was therefore

somewhat coincidental, although on the whole related to the myriad of disputes raging in
the Middle East, Asia, and Africa that year.

Furthermore, the correspondence also

indicates a continuing U.S. -Soviet competition to arm clients and thereby reduce each
other's world-wide influence.
Thus, there is an evident arms sales race especially in the sale of major weapons,
which increased fourfold in the l 970's compared to the 60's, and eightfold compared to the

50's. The yearly increase is put at 25 percent from 1975-80 compared to 15 percent from
70-75 and 10 percent from 65-70. 32 In the midst of such international pressures, as well
as domest.ic economic and technological incentives, unilateral arms restraint policies are
not likely to be rigorously enforced by major powers (even the_ Swedes report increased
sales pressures, despite a restrictive policy, as energy and other costs mount).
Yet for a variety of reasons some of the U.S. restraints are likely to be retained.
Certainly a strong. case can be made for even more stringent restraints since arms
transfers frequently do not bring the type of influence abroad major powers have sought.
Both Americans and Russians have been rudely expelled in recent years by long-standing
arms customers and clients. Alternate arms sources are increasingly available, even for
sophisticated weapons. Costs are mounting and might bankrupt some Third World states.
However, spokesmen in both the Carter and Reagan Administrations have seen Soviet
"successes" in the Third World as due to U.S. passivity and weakness rather than to unique
and isolated local or regional conditions. Hence, worries about the viability of influence
obtained through arms transfers are not likely to motivate a Reagan policy of restraint,
although weapons proliferation may so clearly jeopardize regional stability and U.S.
control that efforts for multilateral restraints, or consumer restraints as the French
advocate, could be revived.

-25Instead, the management arguments of the bureaucracy· are likely to foster the
retention of some P .D. 13 provisions. In particular there is little or no cont_roversy about
the "supply U.S. forces first" doctrine, and little opposition to at least a careful review
before advanced technology is released.

As sales competition looms, support can be

marshalled for the co-production and third country transfer provisions as well, although
advocates of co-production might point to cost savings in an era when new technological .
breakthroughs are increasingly expensive for any single country and when employment
concerns plague every region of the world.

It is likely that restrictions on U.S.

government and company sales promotions will be eased; and almost certainly the no
"development for exportu clause will fall by the wayside.
Finally we must consider the implications of the newly developed logic justifying
"export only" weapons development.

Remembering the export pattern of the 1950's, it

could be argued that developments s_uch as F-X limit the proliferation of weapons
technology and destructiveness by promoting the export of modern but non-advanced
weapons.

Futhermore, such weapons sales would be subject to governmental supervison

an_d control on a c~se-by-case basis. However, the availability of scaled down modes! or
slightly retarded systems will tend to keep costs down, and hence sales are likely to rise
steadily. Many more weapons, albeit of lower sophistication are likely to be sold. Such
systems will pack high _destructive potential, so that the analogy to the 1950's breaks
down.

Obsolete propeller driven planes or early model jets could wreak considerable

havoc on ill-armed opponents, but generally could not compete with later jet models in
speed and destructive potential. today's "export only" systems are likely to be of the
same general order of destructive potential as the most sophisticated systems, or else
nationalistic customers-- with many potential sources to choose from--would not want
I

them. Manufacturers will have to overcome costomers' suspicions at being offered models
admittedly inferior to and not included in the U.S. arsenal. With costs of sophisticated
.

-~-

systems rising rapidly; some manufacturers may increasingly emphasize sales of such

-26systems to industrialized and oil rich states while eschewing the rest of the Third World
market. Other manufacturers are likely to promote "export only" models to lower cost,
and equip them to compete with British, French, and Soviet models. The overall potential
for Third World warfare will escalate sharply, both because of "export only" sales and the
"trickle down" of second or third hand weapons from states purchasing newer models. The
escalation might be sharper than would be the case if the choice remained between selling
the escalation sill be standard U.S. forcesi technology vs. no sale. The higher cost of U.S.
arsenal systems, and the greater potential American governmental reluctance in releasing
them could do more to dampen Third World arms races than the supposed benefits of
selling less refined and advanced systems.
Depending upon the degree of uniqueness in systems such as F-X, they could also
turn U.S. production from Pentagon needs. An upgraded F-S presumably would prolong FS production capabilities, but entireiy new export oriented products might be· of little use
to the American government.

In the past, U.S. policy was premised on U.S. security

needs, with economic interests coming second and reiating mainly to longer production
runs and lower costs.

A wholesale encouragement _of export-oriented products could

reverse these priorities, fitting U.S. regional power balance concerns, but raising balance
of payments questions to primary status.
Far more lasting alterations of

u~s.

policy may result from Republican control of

the Senate. The efforts of Senator Helms and others to abolish ceilings on commercial
sales and restrictions on U.S. intervention in such places as Angola are likely to bear more
fruit. The result could be much increased commercial sales despite purchaser preferences
for FMS and bureaucratic desires for control, and the melting of restraints on African
shipments so evident in the 1977 data.
Before his departure from Washington, Senator Javits had been pushing for yearly
sales plans by executive agencies and reported to Congress to replace FMS ceilings. This
idea seems popular throughout the bureaucracy and stands a good chance of adoption.

-27Supposedly it would still promote quick establishment of priorities, though· there would
appear to be even more loopholes and potential exceptions to the plan's implementation
during the year than those of the ceiling. Critics of the ceiling argued that it represented
as much a sales target as a limit; a plan would also represent a target, though perhaps a
less specific one. Symbolically the ceiling's demise might be viewed abroad as a signal of
U.S. resolve to sell ever larger quantities of arms.
Senator Helms and others are likely to· continue efforts on behalf of certain
manufacturers to have various transport and propeller aircraft, trucks, helicopters,
communications equipment, and anything with "civilian applications" removed from the
munitions list (requiring State Department licenses) and moved to the Commerce
Department list.

This measure has already passed the House of Representatives in

modified form, and is likely to pass the Republican controlled Senate as well.
Because of bureaucratic consensus, careful consideration is likely whenever sophisticated technologies might be released, but a National Security Adviser, as well as regional
bureaus, might work to co.ntravene such restraints in cases of major regional powers such
•

I

l

'

as Brazil, Argentina, South Korea, Israel, Nigeria, Zaire, or Egypt. Managers sensitized to
the Iranian debacle and worried about regional arms races and balances might try to resist
or limit such sales; the result could be more impetus for weapons designed carefully for
export, although if carried too far this might divert production lines from U.S. military
needs.
The process for reviewing controversial arms transfers will probably be continued in
the bureaucracy, despite notions of cutting the "size of gover-nment."

Fewer cases are

likely to find their way to the President's desk for review, however. Dollar volumes of
U.S. transfers are likely to increase further in the 1980's, even after inflationary effects.
Petro-dollars are still available to pay the high costs. Six or seven F-X customers have
been identified, with more in the offing as the plane is marketed. ,Third World countries
such as Pakistan or. India, which can ill afford the cost, will probably join the bidding for

-28new weapons and press for co-production agreements to avoid complete dependence and
maintain their arms races and industries. Restraints, currently evident on sales to Africa,
might erode with increasing U.S. -Soviet competition on that continent.
Even in Jimmy Carter's last days as President efforts were underway to modify the
Arms Export Control Act to allow presidential authority to permit sales in emergencies,
to eliminate advance Congressional notification of FMS sales to allies, and to "clarify"
restrictions on the types of defense "services" U.S. advisers could lend to countries
engaged in "self defense" or other.military operations. 33 The Reagan Administration is
likely to continue such modifications, as Congressional oversight diminishes, and is
confined to certain "trustworthy" committee chairpersons.
Yet no administration in a major power would completely abdicate control and
consideration of arms sales, since arms can be used or can work against major power
interests.

Restraints might be totally removed from transfers to specific favored

countries, perhaps sometimes with disappointing results, but a case-by-case approach is
likely.

Such an approach in contrast to a rigorously enforced general policy may be

unavoidable when dealing with a complicated politico-military-economic activity such as
arms transfers.

However, failure to establish and maintain general policy guidelines,

publicly enunciated and carefully enforced, could be disastrous. Administrators have now
recognized the problem:
Unrestrained arms transfers can generate arms races, increase the
likelihood of local conflicts, heighten the danger of great-power
confrontation, and divert resources from badly need economic and
social development. In unstable circumstances the political influence
sought through arms transfers· may be quickly lost and the arms may
be used in ways not initially contemplated or in the U.S. interest.
Unrestrained arms transfers also pose the continuing risk of the
compromise of sensitive military technology ••• (A) controlled arms
transfer policy is necessary to reduce the threat which the uncontrolled proliferation of c~ventional arms can pose to regional stability and our own security.
It. will be difficult for a new administration totally to yield these bureaucratic insights.

-~

-29In the late 1970's agencies began to give more thorough consideration to the
unintended consequences of sales and the effects they have in the Third World. While this
did not show up in the sales and transfer figures, such reconsiderations if continued over
time could increase the skepticism about sales as foreign policy levers and begin to erode
the sales consensus.

Pressures will build for exceptions to formal regulations, but.

regulations represent both important bureaucratic check-points and symbolic statements
to administrators and foreign powers.

Healthy skepticism about priorities and the

efficacy of strategies is all too rare in foreign policy administration; an institutionalized
program of sales restraint, with built-in delays, facilitates reconsideration. As such it has
been a valuable foreign policy innovation.

I
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TABLE
SELECTED 11 TURNDOWNS AND ALL SALES TO COUNTRIES "IN FY 1977

Country

Total Sales
($ mi 1-1 ion)

Africa

Region Total 23.3
(20.0 commercial)

Algeria

I terns*

Turndown (off) Items

.186

Pist_ols (radios)

Angola

.022

Electronic Spare Parts
Voice Priv. Device

Commercial: Super King Aircraft;
T-34 Aircraft; Air Defense Radars
None reported

Benin
Botswana

None reported
.002

Cameroon

7-73

Chad

.015

Ethiopia

4.25

Gabon

• 178

Gambia

None reported

Ghana

.283

Ivory Coast
Kenya

None reported
.228

Lesotho
Liberia

.001
• 166

Libya

None reported

Malagasy Rep.

.066

Radios

FMSi Maps and Navigational Charts
eorii.~ercial: 22G222 Aircraft; Tank
Transporters (3rd country transfer)
None reported

Mali

.000

Cartridges

None reported

Mauritania

.098

Radio~ and Electronics
Spares (Chemical Agent
Equipment)

Commercial; 10 AD-4 Aircraft
(Wo~ld War II Vinta~e); Night
Vision Equipment

_-.;

Cartridges and
Pistols

Cargo Aircraft (vehicles, None reported
spares, radios, rifles)
Image I tens ifers and
FMS: Fighter Bombers, Helicopters;
Pistols
Rocket Launchers
Commercial: Night Vision Equipment
F-S Spare Parts
Commercial: F-S spares; AIM guided
(vehicle spares)
missile promotion; Naval Gun Mounts
and Ship Defense Systems
Spares (cartridges
Commercial: Wide Range Receivers
sights)

Electronlcs Spares
(Small Arms Equip.)

Commercial: Armored Personnel
Carriers
Commercial: Chinod<,-Hel icopters

f!:12.:
Training Equipment
(Small arms; Spares
cartridges; grenades)
Pistols
Cartridges (Small
arms; speech scramblers)

;;.

..,

Commercial: Bell Helicopters
Commercial: Hughes Helicopters

Especially smal 1 dollar volume in parentheses

1_05 mm Howitzers
FMS: Data on A-4 Aircraft
eoiiimercial: 16 TA-45 Aircraft.;
Laser Guided Bombs; Target Drones;
APC's (3rd country transfer);
Skyhawk Aircraft
None reported
None reported

~

Country
Total Sales
Items
Turndown (off) FY 1977
_________
.;..;..
_;______________________________
-Hz
($ ___
mi l1 ion)
Mauri t Lus

.038

Riot Control Equip.
(Sma.11 Arms)

Morocco

31.3

Cargo Aircraft; Spar=s & FMS: Mini-Gun Equipped Hel icoptors;
Ammo; APC; Small Arms
Redeye Missiles, Stinger Missiles ·
Mine Detectors .

Nigeria

1.61

Navig Sys; Electronics
Spafci~; Aircraft Spates;
(Tools; Transponders)

Commercial: Airborne Laser
Locator T-2 Aircraft

Senegal

• 197

Navig.Sys; Small Arms;
Speech Scramblers

Commercial: Night·Vision Equip.

Soma! ia

None reported

South Africa

5.70

Vehicle & Aircraft (C-130)Commercial: C-130 $pares; Ground
Spa-res; Navig.Equip;
Support Equip; Hughes Helicopters;
Electronics Spares;
Mobile Assault Bridge Equip.
Tat.ik_ Engine Parts

Spanish .Morocco

.001

Cartridges~ Pistols

None reported

Sudan

.089

Chemical Agent Equip.
{Pistols)

Commercial: A-10 Aircraft
promotion

Tanzania

.351

Elec~ronics Spares
(rifles)

Commercial: Radars

Tunisia

2.68

F-86 Spares;Radio
Equip and Spa res;
Helicopter Support
Equip; Vehicle Spares

FMS: Improved Chapparal
Commercial: A-10 Aircraft
promotion

Upper Vo:l ta

,054

Small arms

Zaire

1.80

C-130- Spares (Small
Arms·; E1ect ron i cs Spa res
and Radios)
·

Commercial: AH-15 Helicopters;
M~l6 Rifles;. APC's (involving
3rd country tran~~r); ·ship and
fire:~ control· P:adar; TA-4 Skyhawk
Aircraft

Zambia

.216

Small Arms andRadios

Commercial: Mobile Assault
Bridge Equip.

East Asia
--

Reg i ona I tot a 1 588 (, 322 Commerc i a 11

Australia

"44. 7

Aircraft Spares; Pistols FMS: AIM (under review)
Rifles and Ammo; Grenades;and Stinger
Electronic Spares; VehicleCommercial: Fire Control System
Spa-res; Radar Surveillancepromotion and Day and Night
(Radios)
TV System

.235

"Mines & Sma1·1 Arms
and Spares

None reported

:,;

-;_

FMS: Sma 11 Arms & Ammo
Commercial: Chinook Helicopters;
Night Vision Equ_ip.

&

Spares

&

APC 1 s

None promoted

None reported

#3
Country

Total Sales
( $ million}

Burma

.039

Taiwan (China)

91.9

Turndown (off) items

Items

· Sonar & Speech Scramblers Commercial: Chinook Helicopter
(Weapons Spares)
proposal
F•5 Aircraft;spar,es ammo;
Arms, Navig, Sys.;
Radio & Radar; Missile
Support Equip; R1ot
Control Agent; Tank.-,
Spares

French Polynesia .002

Cartidges

Hong Kong

3.80

Electonics Spares
Navig. System;
Riot Control &
Small Arms; Computer
& Electronics Spares;
Night Vision

Indonesia

8.,99

Japan

136

Korea (Rep)

165

Macao

Aircraft Spares;
Electronics Spares;
Helicopters, & Support;
Veh i c 1e Spares; Rad•i os;
Smal 1 Arms
· Fire Control Sys;
Hel~copter support;
Electronics Spares;
Aircraft & Sattelite
Spares; Rocket & Missile
Spares & Support Equip;
Radar Grd. C~ntrol
Equip; Small Arms; ( &
Ri9t Control) & Spares

FMS: Tech Data Packages; Gun;
Maverick MTssiles; F-l6 1 s; AIM
(under review); Harpoon & Chapparal
Missiles; Flamethrowers
Commercial: F-18 Aircraft (under
review); Dragon; Roland promotion;
Infrared Scanners; Maverick;
M1niguns; TOW; SAM promotion; Sonar
romot ion; MSO Ammo ( 3r.d Country
transfei ; Fire Control System; Day
andp, Night TV System
Non'e' r~orted
Commerical; Hughes Helicopters
proposal

FMS: Aircraft Miniguns Commerical:
Light Weight Gun Pods; lntellegince
System· proposals; MSO Ammo (l!L
country sale); LAMPS ESM Systems. FMS: XM•l Tank AGT 1500 Tank Engine;
(under review); Cannon Launched
Guided Projectile

MM

Aircraft & Helicopter
FMS: Stinger; FLIR; Fuel Thickener;
Spares; Supp 1 t, Equip;. -Defoliant; M-60 Tank; Lance Missile
Ammo; Fire Control Sys.
Commercial: Roland gcomotjoq; Side
Spares; Missile Spares
Looking Radar; F-15 Tech Data; M-47
& Support; Night Vision
Dragon; SAM promotion defended; Sonarn
·promotion; Fire Control Sys. promotic
Spares; Patrol Craft;
Radios (Riot. rontrol
Chinook Helicopter promotion; Day
Equip; Sonar(Tank
Night TV promotion; F-18 Aircraft
Spares)
promotion (Unde-r review)
Cartridges

&

Pistols

Ammo; F-5 & C-130
Spares; Helicopters &
Supp~ft Equip~ Small
Arms & Spares;Vehicle
Spares; (Night Vision:
Mine t)etector &Craft

None repo_rted
Commercial: A-10 Aircraft promotion;
A-7 Tech Data; MS □ Ammo (3rd country
~ ) CH47 Helicopter promotion

#4

,I(

Country

Total Sales
($ mi 1lion}

Items

New Caledonia

~074

Ammo

New He l;iri des

.002

Ammo & Rifles

None Reported

New Zealand

27.6

Helicopter Support;
Ammo; Aircraft Spares;
Small Arms & Spares

None Reported

.. 188

Exp,los i ves; Sma 11
Arms; Riot Control
Agent; Voice Privacy
Device

None Reported

Philippines

15.1

C•130 1 s; Ammo; Aircraft
FMS: 105mm Howitger Tech, Data;
Spares;.Helicopter
Harpoon Turn-Off-Not Releasable);
Support; Radio & Communic,Walleye; F-; F-1 ; Redeye &
Equip; Small Arms Spares;;Skyeye; Commercial: A-10 promotion;
Tank Sp~res
·
Patrol Boats; APC's (3rd country sale)
A-T Tech~ & promotion; Machine
Guns; High Mobility Intelligence
System; Sonar Specs; M50 Ammo
(3rd co. sale)

Singapore

30.0

FMS: Hawk Missile Commerical: Laser
A-4.Aircraft & Spares;
·
F-5 Spares; Electronics Guided Bombs; Chi nook proposa 1;
Spares; Ammo; Small Arms B.ifle Factory; Mach-ine· Guns
& Spares; Radibs; Side•
winder Support (Riot
Control; Truck Wreckers)

Thai land

16.1

Ammo; Electronics &
Aircraft Spares;Vehicle
Spares; Sma 11 Arms; · ·
Shi~ & Rocket Spares;
Trucks; Radtos (Riot
Contrbl Agent; Helicopter
Support)

FMS: White Phosphorous Ammo;
Maverick Missile; Gatlfrig,--.- Gun
Commercial: 20 mm & MSO Ammo
(3rd co. sales); Chapparal promotion;
TF34 Engine Tech Data; Sonar
proposal; Chinook Helicopters

Regional Total 970

(452 Commercial)

Turndown (off) FY 1977
&

Small Arms

·None Repor_ted

Near East & South
Asia

Abu Dhabi

·None Reported

Commer.cial: Promotion of A-4 Aircraft

Afghanistan

• 132

RadiostElectronics Spares None Reported
(Smal ( Arms & Ammo)

Bahrain

.686

Aircraft Spares; Smail
Arms & Riot Control;
Electronics Spares
(Ammo)

FMS: F•5E Aircraft: TOW; Harpoon;
Redeye; and Guided Missile Patrol
Boats

Bangladesh

.808

Electronits Spares;
Radios (Small Arms)

Commercial: Fl04 G Aircraft (3rd
Country Transfer); G91Y Aircraft
(3rd country sale)

#5
Country

Total Sales
( $ mi 11 ion)

Items

Turndown (off) FY 1977

Cyprus

.100

Electronics Spares
Small Arms & Ammo
& Spares

None Reported

Dubai

None Reported

Egypt

1.40

Small Arms; Riot
Control Agent;
Ammo; Aircraft &
Electronics- Spares;
Navigational System

India

l O.9

I ran

297

Artillery Projectiles;
Commercial: Modular Flare & Chaff
Slectroni~s Spare~; Gyro- Dispensing Equipment; lnfared Line
scope;Aircraft Spares;'
~canner; Press for producing 155 mm
Radios~Sonar;Riot Control Projectiles; Remote Control Sys. for
Agt;Small Arms & Ammo; - Drones; A-4 Aircraft; Skyeye RPV.
Radar(Helicopter Sup.Eqp)
Airborne & Ground
FMS: Mine & Torpedo Sys; TAC Fire;
Control Radio-Radc;!·rs;
Gunfire Display Unit; Encapsalated
F-4, F-5, & other.Harpoon (sub. launched) Harpoon
Aircraft Spares &
Coproduction; ARM; ECM Pod; Mav~rick
Engines; Artillery &
- Coprod; Stinger; Command & Control
Ammo; Drones; Electronics Courses; INS & Radar for F-16 & F-18
Spares & Test Equip;
Coproduction; Cargo Aircraft; Certain
Gyroscopes; Helicopters; Phosphorus Ammo & Napalm~
Military Bridges -&
Commercial; F'-15 Tech Data; Radar
Tech Data; YC15 Aircraft; AIM; A-2
Vehicle Spares; Missile
Spares; Night Vision &
Tech Data; Target Drone; M-60 Ma~hi~e
Nuclear Equipment;eommuni.Gun Production License; Chaff
Eqp; Patrol Boat Spar·es; Dispenser; Angle Rate Bombing
Radios; Tank Spares; TOW System; PAVE TACK; MOD FLIR; AN-PAQ
& Sidewinder Missiles &
& TAQ; S19 ads; Computer Generated
Support;Riot Control Agt Image Subsystems (-3rd Country Sale)
.& Smal 1 Arms; Voice Rriv- Promotion; Plans for Laser-Guidetj
acy Devices;TGaining Eqp Bombs; Patrol Boats; Skyeye; M-50
Spares
20mm Ammo (3rd Co. Sale); Fire
Control system; Day-Night TV System

Iraq

Pistols; Voice Privacy
Speech Scramblers

&

Israel

•'

Commercial: Promotion of A-4/TA-

4 Aircraft

425

EtlS: TOW
Commercial: Mortar Fire Control
Radar; AGT100 Vehicular Turbine
Engine Promo; Tech Data for Air
Defens~; APC's; Electronic Warfare
System;. A-JO Aircraft Promo; A-4 .
Trainer; bEng i nes & Transmiss i ans fo.r
Russian Tanks; Skyeye RPV; Pods for
MIG 21 1 s (3rd Country Sale).

Commercial: C-9 B Jet; Transportable
Surveillance Sys.; Patrol Boats;
Skyeye RPV.

Ai1,i;'Mods; Aircraft
FMS: CB0-72 (Fuel air explosive);
Control & Support Equip m='1"R. Fighter (Transfer to 3rd Co);
& Spares;Radar;F-4 AirAIM-9; Maverick B; kt-!3;_ lankr
craft;Radio Eqp;Ammo;Bomb Aircraft; APC's
·
Spares;Arti-llery Spares
Commercial: 200-300 Muzzle Velocity
Patts; Chem. Agent Equip Radar Sets Cooroduction; Weapons
& Detectors;ElectronicDesignation Radar System; BLU-82B
Control & lest Eqp. &
Bombs; XM-l Tank; Tech Data on
Spares; Jet Engines &
Roland; AIM logistic Support Plan;
Spares;Explosives; Gun
· M-113 Modificatiori; Locan; AN/FPS·
Spares; He 1i copter SupportUpgrade. Cooroduct ion of Lase,r
Equip; Image
Guidance System

#6
Country.

Total Sales
( $ mi 11 ion)

Items

Turndown (Off) FY 1977

Israel

Intensifiers; Vehicle
Spares; TOW Missile
Launchers & Hawk
& Redeye Support
Equip; PerJscopes;.
Small Arms; Radios;
Riot Control Agents;
Sidewinder & Sparrow
Support; Tank Spares;
TV Cameras; Torpedoes;
Trucks; Wave Tubec (Sonar;
Voice Privacy Equip; Laser
Range Finder; Gyros; :tm:aqe
lnte~sifiers)
·

Jordan

Jet Engines~ Veblcle
& Aircraft Spares;
Hawk Support Equip;
Sma 11 Arms & Ammo;
Radiosp Tank, Weapons,
& Electronics Spares;.
Telephones; Navig Sys.;
Chemical Agent Equip; TOW Missiles &··Support

EHS: Maverick (Air to Ground
Missile); Laser Guided Bombs;
Additional Redeye & Stinger
Missiles.
Commercial: Target Drones; Laser
Range f,inder (Developed Solely for
Ex ort); Day-Night Sensor .E.,romotion;
A• Aircraft; APC (General Export
1i cense denied}

Aircraft Spares; Navig~
Equip; Small Arms; Mine
Detectors; Aircraft·
Gr.ourld Contro·1 (Radar
E.qu ip)

FMS: S~rike Missile; Harpoon; Lance;
Redeye/Stinger; 811 Howitzers; 175 mm
SP Gun
Commerical: Tacfire; KC 33 Launching
System; A-10 Aircraft Proposal;
Patrol Boats~Skyeye; A_PC 1s (general

Kuwait

.872

4

export license devied)

,

Lebanon

•. 002

Night Vision Devices

Libya

.199

Aircra~t Spares (c-130)
(Protecti~e Personnel
Equipment)

Moroco-

31.3

C-130 Aircraft & Spares; None Reported
OtherAircraft Spares;
Ammo & Artillery & Bomb
Project i 1es; APC I s. El ec:-_
tron i cs Test Eqp. '& Spares;
Guns & Vehicle Spares;Mine
Oetectors;TOW Missiles &
Support;Small Arms & Scopes
& Spares;Radios;Rocket,Torp~,
Missile & Mine Spares

Nepal

None· Reported

None Reported

Commercial:
Promotions

Hughes Helicopter

#7
Total Sales
( $ mi 1l i.on )

Items

Dwan

1.15

Jet Engine&. Aircraft
FMS: 175 mm SP Guns (turnoff)
Spares; Ammo; Hel.icopter c'oiiimercial: Skyeye; Promotion of
Support Equipment;
A-4/TA-4 Aircraft
Navig. Equip.; Small
Arms & Spares; Radios;
Voice Privacy Deva

Pakistan

19.2

El~ctronics Spares;
FMS:Manufacture Ammo; A-7 Aircraft
"fow Equipped Helicopters; Cluster
Ammo & Small Arms;
Aircraft Spares;
Bombso
Exp 1os i ves; Nav i g. Eqp;
Commercial: Promo of Command &
He I i copter and Hawk Control Moderii'ization; M-65 TOW;
Support EqpJ.; Protective A-4 Aircraft; Hughi Helicopter
Personnel Eqp;. & Spares; Promotion.
Radar· o Radios;Rocket.
& Ship Spares; Telephone
Eqp.; Trucks; TOW Suppt.
E·qp. (Parachutes)

Qatar

.578

Anmo; Jet Engine Spares;
Small Arms; Radios

• Country

Turndown (Off) FY 1977

FMS: i=-SE Aircraft; 155/mm Howitzers;

Ww

Commercial:~ of A-4/TA-4 Aircraft
Saudi Arabia

158

Aircraft & Helicopter
Support & Spares; APC 1 s
Ammo; Barges; Howi,tzers
& Spares; Navig, Sys;
Vehicles; Night Vision
Devices; Hawk & TOW
Suppt. Eqp.; Patrol
Craft; Pers. Prote~ti~e
Eqp. & Spares; Radios;_
Ship Spares; Sma 11 Arms;
Tank Spares; Target
Drones; Utility Landing
Craft; Voice Privacy
Eqp; Mortars

Sri Lanka

.021

Mapping Eqp; Electronics None Reported
Spares; Helicopter Suppt.
(Small Arms & Ammo)

Syria

.040

Electronics Spares
{Pistols & Infrared
Viewers)

None Reported

Tunisia

2.68

F-86 Spares; Ammo;
Batteries; Electronics
Spares; Helicopter
Suppt; Parachutes; Radios; Ship Spares
{Small Arms & Pyrotechnics)

None Reported

FMS: Munitions Facilities~ Tech
Data for Ammo Production; siiri'ke

#8

Country

Total Sales
($ million)

Items

UAE

.658

C•130 Spares; Ammo;
None Reported
Radios; Electronics
Spares & Test Eqp; Jet
Engines & Spares, Small
Arms (Riot Control Agents;
Protective Eqpo Spares}

Yemen

• 00 1

Pistols & Revolvers

Latin America

Regional Total
237

(150 Mommercial; Incl.
Cananda)

.002

Cartridges; Riot
Control Agents

None Reported

Aircraft Spares; Radar
Gfd. Control Eq?:;
Ammo; Military Spares;
Computer Components;
Electronics Spares;
Helicopters and. Suppto
Eqp; Nav i g;. Sys. & Image
lntensJfiers; Vehicle
Spares; Training Eqp.&
Night Vision Spares;
Other Weapons & Small
Arms.& Sub Machines Guns;
Pers .. Prot Eqp_; Radars ·
& Radios; Shlp Spares;
Sub Spares; Trucks &
Voice Privacy Eqp •

ill,: Sidewinder; Cobra He Ii copter
Gunships
Commercial: Ground surveillance
Sys; Night Vision Eqp for ¥N Rifle;
Noctron IV; Armored Car; Submachine
Guns & Ammo; AR-18 rifle & A;ccessorie?
Image Intensifiers; APC 1 s

Argentina

11 .1

&

.•

Turndown (Off) FY 1977

None Reported

Bahamas

• 008

Small Arms; Ammo.
Manufacturing Eqp •

None Reported

Barbados

• 008

Pistols & Ammo

None Reported

Belize

.012

.Small Arms & Ammo

None Reported

Bolivia

.708.

Aircraft Trainers
& Spares; Ammo;
Parachutes; Small
Arms; Zoom Scopes;
(Radios; Protective
Eqp. Spares; Helmets)

Commercial: APC 1 s (3rd Country
Transfer)

Braz i 1

13.6

Ammo; Aircraft Sparesj
APC Spares; Electronics
Spare~; Explosives;
Gyrocompass; Helicopter
Support~d, Eqp- .
. Intensifier Spares;
Vehicle Spares;
Parachutes; Night
V1s ion Devices; Sma 11
Arms; Radar & Radios;
Riot Control Agent;
Sonar

FMS:. Sidewinder; Harpoon
-roffimercial: ~ Support for
Propel lent Processing Facility;
APC's; Coprod of Vehicular•lurbines;
Promo A-7 Aircraft

#9

;,;

.

Country

Total Sales
($ million)

Items

Turndown (Off) FY 1977

British Vgne
Islands

.077

Chemo Agent Eqp

None Reported

Cayman Is.

.ooo

Riot Control Agent

None Reported

Chi le

21. 3

Commercial: T-34 Trainers
Attack Aircraft &
Spares; A/C Mods;
Electronic Test &
Control Eqp,& Spares;
Jet Engines; Vehicle Spares; Parachutes &
Communic.Eqp.; Radios;
Ship Spares; Telephone_
& Telegraphic Eqp. (Small
Arm~)

Columbia

7.07

Cartridges, Ammo, &
& Ammo Manufacturing
Facilities; Helicopters
and Suppt; Electronics
Spares; Grenades; Small
Arms & Spares; R! ot
Control Agent; Submarine
Spares_

-

Casta Rica

.132

Ammo; Riot Control
& Chem. Agent Eqp;
Small Arms; Boats

None Reported

Dominica

.ooo

Cartridges

None Reported

Dom. Rep.

.839

Cartridges; Loading
Machines; Machine Guns;
Small Arms & Spares;
Riot Control Agent

None Reported

Ecuador

.671

APC Spares; Ammo;
Electronics Spares;
Helmets; Aircraft
Spares & Helicopter
Suppt; Small Arms
(Pers. Protective Eqp)

FMS: F-5 Aircraft & Hawk AntiAircrart Missile Sys.
Commercial: F-104 1 s (3rd co.
transfer); KFIR Aircraft (3rd co.
sale); Promo of A-10 & A-7 Air-

FMS: S-2E Aircraft

cr'a'ft. -

El Salvador

0271

Ammo; Chem Agent_ Eqp;-.
Electronics Spare~;
Explosives; •Vehicles;
Small Arms-

Commercial: Driver's Viewer &
Image Intensifier; Ingram· Sub•
machine Guns

Grenada

.002

Pistols

None Reported

Guadeloupe

.001

Rifles

Guatemala

1.02

FMS: 5.56 mm Ammo (1 Million rounds)
Cartridges; Electronics
Spares; Parachutes; Small tcimmercial: APC's;Drivers Viewer
& lntens1fer; Small Arms ManuArms & Spares
facturing Machinery

&

Cartridges

None Reported

#10
..

Country

Total Sales
($ million)

Items

Turndown (Off) FY 1977

Guyana

.113

Electronics Spares;
Ammo; Smal 1 Arms •

None Reported

Haiti

• 451

Electronics Spares;
Cartridges; Vehicle
Spares; Small Arms
& Spares

None Reported

Honduras

.106

Ammo; Hawk Support
Eqp; Smal 1 Arms &
Spares

FMS: A-6 Aircraft
Convnercial: Driver~ Viewer
lntesifier

Ammo; Chem & Riot
Control Agent Eqp;
Electronics & .
Vehicle Spares;
Smal 1 Arms

None R_eported

Sma.11 ·Arms

None Reported

Jamaica

.216

Martinique

..-

.

-

&-

Mexic:o

2.39

Ammo & Manufacturing
None Reported
Eqp; Barges; Carbines;chem
Agent Eqp; Explosives;
Navig Eqp; Landing Cr.aft,
Sma 11 Arms &· Spa res
Riot Control Agent;·.
Ships Tanker; Radar
G.rd, Control; Propel lents

Montsersrat

.ooo

Pistols-Revolvers

None Reported

Netherlands
Artitles

.023

Ammo; Chem. Agent.
Eqp; Electronics
Spares, Computer
Spares; Freq. Counter
Sma 11 Arms

None Reported

Nicaragura

1.70·

Ammo, Small Arms &
Spares:Helicopter &
Suppt; Aircraft Spares;
Radios

Commerci a 1: Ingram Machine Guns;
Driver's Viewer & Image- Intensifier

Panama

2.72

Armored Cars;: Ammo;
Artillery Eqp; Cargo
Shipsj Helicopters;
Vehicle_Spares; Small
Arms & Spares

Commercia•J; AN/APS-128 Airborne
Search Radar

Paraguay

.435

Ammo; Small Arms & Spares None Reported

Peru

5o29

Ammo; Electronics .
Spare~ & Test Eqp; Patrol
·Boat Spares;.Helicopter
Suppt; Navig. Sys;
Vehicle Spares; Aircraft
Spares; Parachutes;

FMS: Bombs;· Marine Corps Eqp;
APC1 s Command Post Carriers;
.Reconnalss~nce Vehicles
Commercial: TOW; Tech Data on A-4;
Airborne Search Radar; Armored cars;
T-2 Aircraft; APC 1 s (and 3rd co.

#11

Total Sales
( $ mi 11 ion)

• Country

Items

Turndown (Off) FY 1977

Radios; Small Arms
Spares; Sonar,
Sub Spares; Torpedoes;
Telephone Sets; Wave
Tubes (Riot Control
Agent)

transfer);~Teth Dat~ for Fire
Control Sis. for Destroyers;Vehicle Night Driving Sys.; Prorro.
A-7 Aircraft
-

&

St. Christopher

.001

Artillery; Explosives;
Grenades

None Reported

St. Lucia

.003

Pistols & Ammo

None Reported

Surinam

.008

Sma 11 Arms
Cartridges

None ,Reported

Trinidad
Tobago

.027

Jet Engine Spares
(Pistols & R·evolvers)

None Reported

Turks &
CaJcos Is.

.003

Chem. Agent Equip

None Reported

Uruguay

.968

Commercial: Hydrafoils; TruAmmo; Aircraft Trainer
& Spares; Vehicle Spares; Fl ite Projectit~s; Shoulder
Fired Gas Guns
Helicopter Suppt., Sma 11
Arms

Venezuela

11 • 8

Elec. Test Eqp & Spares; FMS:Mini-T~t Weapons Sys; A-6 Aircraft
Vehicle & Aircraft
Commercial:~ of A-7 & A-10
Spares; Small Arms &
Spares; Trucks & Utility Aircraft
Landing Craft; Aircraft
Suppt. & Spares; Ammo;
Chem. Agent.Equip; Radios;
Pyrotechnics; Ship Spares;
Riot Control Agents;
~peech Scrambler'~; Boat
& Crafts

·

&

1. Through September, 1978 the following additional types of turndowns or turnoffs were
noted:
Africa:

Several Bell Helicopter with TOW Commercial Cases (15 countries); scattered
other helicopter and missile_ cases; no FMS turndowns reported.

East Asis:

.-.

•

Commercial: Burma, Malaysia, & Thai land (Gun Pods); Taiwan (Rocket Eqpt. &
Aircraft Engines); Indonesia (A-10 & F-8 Aircraft); Korea( 11 Enforceru
aircraft· & coprod 0f missiles & aircraft)·Philippines (Helicopters);
Singapore (Machiae Pistols). FMS: Korea(F-18 under review); Phillippines
(A-7 Aircraft)
·
Latin America: Commercial: Night Vision Eqp & Laser Sighted Rifles (5 countries); Tech.
Assist.,for Mexican Navy (pending); Coprod of Ammo & Night Vision in Bolivia;
Naval Electronics & Surveillance Pe~u.
FMS: Aircraft Avionics & Moisture Detection Eqp. (El Salvador); F-5's
(Gu~temala); Suspension of al I FMS to NicaraguB because of Human
rights situation; Suspensionof trucks & tools to.Paraguay & Uruguay; A-37 Aircraft to Peru o
·

#12

Near East South Asia: Commercial: Large variety of, systems, especially to Egypt, Iran, lsrae·l
& Sa.jdi Arabia-including advanced .laser technology; Night Vision Eqp. for
Russian-built weapons; TOW, Chaparral, Mortar Fi•re Control, Armored Cars
with Canriron Turret; Cluster bombs (Iran); Sub Control Sys. (lran);lmproved
Radar; Airborn~ Decoy?;· A-10 Aircraft.
FMS: India (Viggen transfer from Sweden); Iran (Pilot Training Transfer
to Lesotho;Advanced Sea & Air missiles & F~4); Jordan (M-60 tanksturn-off, Approved for 1980; Stinger & TOW with armor); Saudi Arabia
(Stinger; Gas Projectiles & Flame Thrower)
Total Value of Exports to Near East - South Asia for l978=$939m with Egypt=
$8.0m (½ for communications eqp.); lndia=10.3m, lran=l58m, lsrae1=305m
2.

NATO and other European Countries excluded here since NATO and Japan do not come under
Presidential policy limitations.

3.

Sources:

For S:iles-Report Required by Section 657. Foreign Assistance Act, (Washington, D.C.
u.-s. Dept. 6LS.taie Fi sea 1 Years_ 1977 and 1978

For Turndowns and Turnoffs-Foreign Military Sales Trust Fund ·(Hearings Before the Task
Force on National Security and International Affairs, Committee on the Budget
U.S. House of Representatives, Oct. 3, 1978} •
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FIGURE

IV

Arms Sales Decision Process
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request
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(James P. Farber)
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Secretary of State
(Edmund Muskie)
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Source: The Mideast Observer in Washington (Oct. 1, 1980), p.2
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